

## Message Text

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22

ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 OMB-01 IO-11 ARA-06 AID-05 ACDA-05 SAM-01

SAJ-01 /095 W

----- 031112

R 111347Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2812

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY GABORONE

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 0352

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, ZA, US

SUBJECT: ZAMBIAN FONMIN COMMENTS ON US ANGOLA POLICY

REF: (A) STATE 030983; (B) STATE 031037; (C) LUSAKA 322

1. APPOINTMENT SOUGHT AND OBTAINED WITH FONMIN BANDA  
FEB 10 TO EXPAND ON CLARIFICATION GIVEN HIM EARLIER (REF C)  
ON SECY'S CONVERSATION WITH NIGERIAN COMMISSIONER FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS GARBA AS WELL AS TO PUT SECY'S FEB 3  
SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

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2. BANDA HEARD OUT PRINCIPAL POINTS TAKEN FROM PARA 3 REF A AND PARA 2 REF B, BUT LIMITED HIS COMMENTS ON US ANGOLAN POLICY TO SAYING QUITE EXMPHATICALLY US WOULD LIVE TO REGRET SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA. BANDA THEN WENT ON TO IMPLY THAT US ASSISTANCE TO FNLA/UNITA WAS URGENTLY NEEDED NOW AND IN QUANTITY IF THESE ELEMENTS WERE TO STOP SOVIET AND CUBAN ADVANCES. UNLESS RESISTED, BANDA THOUGHT SOVIETS AND CUBANS WERE IN ANGOLA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA TO STAY. HE REGRETTED POSITION OF US CONGRESS. SAID HE THOUGHT SECY'S BYHUC CONCEPT ON BALANCE OF POWER EMINENTLY SOUND AND WORKABLE IN ANGOLA IF IT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

3. BANDA SAID HE KNEW THE SOVIETS AND KNEW THEM WELL. ONCE THEY HAD A FIRM MILITARYFOOTHOLD IN ANGOLA AND HAD BROUGHT IN SO MANY CUBAN TROOPS THEY WOULD NOT WITHDRAW EASILY. IN FACT BANDA FORESAW AN INEVITABLE CLASH BETWEEN SOVIETS AND SOUTH AFRICANS AND THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT BE LONG NOW BEFORE SOVIET-BACKED MPLA FORCES CONTINUED SOUTH INTO HEAVILY-DEFENDED BORDER AREA WITH NAMIBIA TO WHICH SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS HAD WITHDRAWN. HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY WOULD BE A POOR MATCH FOR THE SOVIET-TRAINED AND EQUIPPED CUBAN TROOPS.

4. BANDA THOUGHT IT WAS A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR POLICY PLANNERS IN AFRICA, US OR ELSEWHERE TO ASSUME MPLA'S NETO COULD RELENT IN HIS FIRM OPPOSITION TO COALITION GOVT. HE MIGHT EVEN PROVE UNCOMPROMISING ON A MPLA-DOMINATED GOVT, ESPECIALLY IF MPLA ACHIEVES TOTAL VICTORY WHICH IT NOW SEEKING. BANDA ALSO IMPLIED THAT IF MOBUTU THOUGHT HE COULD DO BUSINESS WITH MODERATE ELEMENTS WITHIN MPLA, HE WOULD BE BITTERLY MISTAKEN AS THEY REPRESENT A MINORITY AND HAVE NO REAL CHANCE OF SUPPLANTING NETO. BUT BIGGEST OBSTACLE IN ANY PLAN MOBUTU MIGHT HAVE FOR APPEASEMENT WITH MPLA WAS SOVIET TACTICS WITHDETERMINATION TO HAVE IT NO OTHER WAY BUT THE SOVIET WAY. NETO, A THROUGHLY-COMMITTED STALINIST, WAS THEIR WELL-CHOSEN MAN. BANDA SAID SERGEI SINITSYN, SOVIET COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY IN ADDIS, TOLD HIM ZAIRE WOULD BE THE FIRST COUNTRY TO BE AFFECTED BY

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THE SOVIET'S PLAN FOR ANGOLA.  
WILKMOSKI

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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